The Centre has strongly defended the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019, commonly known as the Triple Talaq law, in the Supreme Court, emphasizing its role in ensuring gender justice and equality for Muslim women. The government’s stance was outlined in an affidavit filed in response to a petition by the Samastha Kerala Jamiathul Ulema, which challenges the constitutionality of the law, claiming it violates Articles 14, 15, 21, and 123 of the Indian Constitution.
In its affidavit, the Centre asserted that the Act is crucial for protecting the fundamental rights of Muslim women, particularly their right to non-discrimination and empowerment. The government explained that the practice of talaq-e-biddat, or instantaneous triple talaq, which the law criminalizes, had “legitimised and institutionalised the abandonment” of Muslim women by their husbands. This practice, the Centre argued, was not merely a private injury but a public wrong, undermining the rights of women and the social institution of marriage itself.
The government’s submission further highlighted the context in which the law was enacted. Despite the Supreme Court’s 2017 ruling in the Shayara Bano case, which declared talaq-e-biddat unconstitutional, reports of such divorces persisted across the country. The Centre pointed out that the court’s decision alone was not sufficient to deter the practice, leading to the need for legislative action to enforce the court’s order and address the grievances of women affected by illegal divorces.
Addressing concerns raised during the legislative process, the Centre noted that initial apprehensions about the law, particularly regarding its non-bailable nature and the provision allowing any person to inform the police of an offense, were addressed. The final version of the law made the offense cognizable only if the complaint was filed by the married Muslim woman herself or a close relative. Additionally, the offense was made non-bailable and compoundable, but only with the permission of a Magistrate, ensuring that the law was both fair and enforceable.
The Centre also underscored the Supreme Court’s consistent position that the judiciary’s role is to interpret the constitutionality of legislation, not to question its wisdom. The government argued that it is the Legislature’s prerogative to decide what is appropriate for society, and the court should respect this boundary. The affidavit emphasized that when the Supreme Court has already declared a practice like triple talaq unconstitutional, it is within the Legislature’s rights to make that practice punishable under law.
Moreover, the Centre contended that the petitioners’ argument—that since triple talaq has no legal effect after the Shayara Bano ruling, it cannot be criminalized—is fundamentally flawed. The government asserted that this reasoning misinterprets the principles of criminal law, which exist to deter illegal conduct, regardless of whether the conduct achieves its intended illegal outcome. The Act, the Centre argued, is necessary to prevent the practice from becoming a “dead letter” that could be freely disregarded without consequence.
The government also dismissed the claim that marriage, being under personal law, should be exempt from general criminal law. It stated that marriage is a social institution that the State has a vested interest in protecting, citing other laws like the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, and the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, as examples of legislation that criminalizes conduct affecting the sanctity of marriage.
In conclusion, the Centre maintained that the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act is a valid exercise of legislative power, aimed at upholding the dignity and rights of Muslim women, and that the petition challenging its constitutionality should be dismissed. The government reiterated that the law is aligned with the broader objectives of gender justice and equality, making it a necessary and justified measure in modern India.