International reporting and political discussions about the war in Sudan are often clouded by oversimplified narratives that obscure the true nature of the conflict. These narratives — “forgotten conflict”, “war of two generals”, and “proxy war” — while partly true, fail to provide the nuanced understanding needed to grasp the complexities at play. Gerrit Kurtz, a senior researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), argues that journalists and policymakers must shift their language to foster a more accurate and balanced conversation.
The “forgotten conflict” narrative suggests that the war in Sudan is overlooked, which, though partially accurate, is misleading. While it’s true that Sudan has not garnered the same international attention as crises in Ukraine or Gaza, the term “forgotten” implies neglect due to sheer accident. In reality, a deliberate lack of focus — by both local and international actors — contributes to this underreporting. In Sudan, the ruling parties, including the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), have stifled media coverage, including revoking licenses for Arabic-language outlets. This censorship, combined with underfunded UN humanitarian appeals, creates an environment where Sudan’s war remains less discussed in the global arena. Furthermore, the notion of a “forgotten” conflict glosses over Western complicity in Sudan’s militarisation, particularly through past collaborations with security forces under former president Omar al-Bashir. For instance, EU support for Sudan under al-Bashir inadvertently bolstered paramilitary groups like the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), now a key player in the war.
The “war of two generals” is another reductionist portrayal. This simplification ties the conflict solely to the personal rivalry between General Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan, head of the SAF, and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), leader of the RSF. While both men’s ambitions contributed to the eruption of violence in April 2023, framing the war as a mere power struggle between two generals fails to address deeper systemic issues. Sudan’s military has long been fragmented, with competing factions vying for control. The war’s roots lie not only in the personalities of Burhan and Hemedti but also in a broader history of militarisation and the exploitation of ethnic militias. The RSF itself evolved from the infamous Janjaweed militias, responsible for atrocities in Darfur, further complicating the narrative. To call it a “war of two generals” is to ignore the broader militarisation that is at the heart of Sudan’s crisis. Many political leaders, particularly those aligned with the former Bashir regime, remain influential in the current conflict, contributing to its fragmentation.
Furthermore, the international community’s tendency to classify the Sudanese war as a “proxy war” obscures the primary drivers of the conflict. While external actors such as Egypt, Iran, and the UAE are involved, their role should not be exaggerated. The war is not simply a battle between regional powers using Sudan as a battleground for their own interests. In reality, the involvement of foreign powers, though significant, does not overshadow the motivations of Sudanese actors. For instance, the UAE’s support for the RSF and Egypt’s backing of the SAF reflect broader geopolitical interests but are not the cause of the war. Sudan’s internal divisions and the fight for control over its security sector are the main drivers of violence. To label the war as a proxy conflict is to risk oversimplifying the situation, leading to a false understanding of the war’s dynamics.
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Kurtz advocates for a more nuanced approach to the war in Sudan, one that moves beyond simplistic labels. Instead of referring to Sudan as a “forgotten conflict”, it should be called an “ignored conflict”, acknowledging that the lack of attention is a result of intentional actions, both domestic and international. Rather than focusing on a “war of two generals”, the conflict should be described as a “war of militarisation”, where various factions are fighting for control of the state. And instead of casting the conflict as a “proxy war”, it is more accurate to discuss the role of “external influence”, which reflects the ongoing interference of foreign powers in Sudan’s internal affairs.
This shift in language can help clarify the conflict for both policymakers and the public. It also has practical implications for how Europe and other international actors engage with Sudan. For instance, European countries could play a constructive role by revising their migration policies, which have contributed to the crisis, and by providing more humanitarian aid. Additionally, European governments can sanction the financial networks of warring factions, reconsider arms exports to external backers, and support Sudanese civil society, both within the country and in exile.
In conclusion, the war in Sudan is too complex to be reduced to oversimplified narratives. By using more precise language, journalists and policymakers can foster a better understanding of the war’s origins, its current dynamics, and potential solutions. Silencing the guns in Sudan requires a nuanced approach that acknowledges the roles of both internal and external actors, as well as the need for comprehensive, inclusive peace efforts.
